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Abstract
Under multistakeholderism, private philanthropic foundations have 
played an increasingly influential role in global development. As part of 
which, foundations have promoted what we call “privatization creep” 
(i.e., mainstreaming market-centric solutions to development). Sidelining 
redistributive approaches altogether, “privatization creep” favours profit-
making over everything else, doing little to “save the world.”
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Despite the backlash against the super-rich in the aftermath of the 2008 finan-
cial crisis and the large Occupy demonstrations, the underlying optimism 
about the transformative power of their philanthropy remains undiminished. 
Nowhere is this transformative power better showcased than in the case of 
resource-scarce developing countries. In 2017, for example, an article in The 
Guardian credited the Gates Foundation as the driving force behind the 
delivery of a basic package of vaccines to 86% of the world’s children, and 
saving the lives of 122 million children globally.1
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The “grand challenge” formulation is another case in point. Inspired by 
the thinking of mathematician David Hilbert, the Gates Foundation 
launched their “Grand Challenges in Global Health” in 2003 for investing 
in path-breaking solutions to complex global health problems framed, tell-
ingly, as scientific challenges. Since then, what we might call the grand 
challenge mind-set has gone mainstream. More recent formulations 
include UKRI’s (UK Research and Innovation, the non-departmental pub-
lic institution comprising of the various research councils) “Global 
Challenges Research Fund” that seeks to apply “cutting-edge” research to 
global development challenges.
While one could critique the downplaying of public health infrastructures 
and investments in the celebratory coverage of the Gates’ Foundation, or how 
philanthropic foundations are able to dictate resources (e.g., in the case of 
grand challenges), or direct resources—along with those of its various part-
ners—into challenges that foundations specify and prioritize, there is little 
doubt about philanthropy’s outsized influence.
Leveraging Influence: Foundations and 
Multistakeholderism
Among others, private philanthropy has extended its influence by steering the 
evolution of global governance institutions and norms (Kumar & Brooks, 
2021). Today, philanthrocapitalism is poised to eclipse the post-war institu-
tional architecture on which global development was designed and delivered 
and replace multilateralism with “multistakeholderism.” Instead of elected 
governments making decisions on global issues and directing multilateral 
institutions to implement them, decision making power is shifting to a more 
fluid and less accountable system of governance that invites stakeholders of 
various kinds to identify and deliver collaborative solutions to global prob-
lems (Gleckman, 2018).
As a system of governance, multistakeholderism’s rise has been enabled 
by businesses’ voluntary formulation and adoption of “stakeholder capital-
ism.” Championed by the Davos super-rich, stakeholder capitalism promises 
a three point (and five further sub-points) agenda for transnational corpora-
tions in “shared and sustained value creation.”2 Beyond the anodyne promise 
of transnational corporations to act as stakeholders themselves “together with 
governments and civil society”—lies their formative power over selecting (or 
excluding) participants, setting (or not setting) clear standards for regulating 
conflicts of interest, controlling (or withholding) levels of transparency, and 
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promoting policies and standards that open/widen/deepen markets while 
bypassing accountability checks (Gleckman, 2018).
Philanthropic foundations have played a central role in the normalization 
of multistakeholderism as a global governance model, concretely through 
their involvement in the launch of several multistakeholder initiatives. What 
is interesting is that this pivotal role cannot be explained by their financial 
contribution alone, which is frequently overshadowed by that of other stake-
holders. The example of the Vaccine Alliance, Gavi, is illustrative. Although 
the Gavi alliance receives funding from both governments and private and 
corporate foundations: publicly it continues to be associated primarily with 
its founder, the Gates Foundation. This is despite governments’ contribution 
having risen from 76% to 82% between 2000 and 2020, while foundations’ 
contributions have dwindled from 24% to 18% over the same period.3
This is not a recent phenomenon, however. The groundwork for Gavi was 
laid in the 1990s when the Rockefeller Foundation was instrumental in estab-
lishing a new model of public-private partnership (PPP). Called product 
development partnerships (PDP),4 such multistakeholder initiatives now 
serve as the template for global health efforts, including the International 
AIDS Vaccine Initiative. The subsequent mainstreaming of the model, engi-
neered and propagated by the Rockefeller Foundation, served to normalize 
involvement of pharmaceutical industry as a prized development partner on 
enviable terms (Moran, 2007).
Similarly, in agriculture the Gates Foundation teamed up with the 
Rockefeller Foundation, architect of the “Green Revolution” of the 1960s 
and 1970s, to launch the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) 
in 2006. AGRA and its successor programmes have commercialized small-
holder farms across sub-Saharan Africa and integrated them into global agri-
businesses’ operations. The financialization of the value chains has benefitted 
private agri-business firms, while its policies have induced food insecurity 
for smallholder farmers (Brooks, 2016).
Starting from an earlier PPP format, then, private foundations have consis-
tently fostered development “partnerships” that have intensified the marketi-
zation, and latterly the financialization, of all aspects of global development. 
In these and several other initiatives, philanthropic foundations shape how 
development is understood and organized to a degree that far outweighs their 
financial contribution (see Kumar & Brooks, 2021 for a detailed discussion 
of institutional mechanisms through which such influence is secured). The 
result, we argue next, has been a steady “privatization creep” in the trajectory 
of the field of development.
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“Privatization Creep”
Over the last seven decades and more, philanthropic foundations have cham-
pioned market-centric solutions to global development in what we call 
“privatization creep.” This marries the propagation of institutional innova-
tions of the kind outlined in the previous section with advocacy for the 
“right” regulatory regime (a light-touch, largely voluntary, with minimal 
governmental interference) in order to create an “enabling environment” 
(mostly with a view to incentivizing private players). It has an ideological 
commitment to a vision of development as a project of individualized self-
improvement oriented to the creation of effective (and more) market sub-
jects (Nally & Taylor, 2015). Privatization creep’s underlying orientation to 
development as human capital formation has led philanthropic foundations 
to invest heavily in promoting market-led solutions to poverty in preference 
to those that involve a redistributive state and/or rights-based civil society.
Trading on their “brand” (and selectively deploying “success stories” and 
“best examples”) and the charismatic power of the super-rich, philanthropic 
foundations have been able to advance privatization creep through their 
unique ability (a “free pass” even) to experiment, with minimal scrutiny. And 
with the arrival on the scene of for-profit foundations like the Omidyar 
Network, philanthropy is today experimenting with new types of global 
investment vehicles to enable financial flows among an even wider range of 
actors in the name of development (e.g., hedge funds, venture capitalists, and 
insurance and accounting firms, among others). Tellingly named “investment 
platforms,” these vehicles aggregate and direct resources to solutions that 
claim to “solve” global challenges while promising investors “maximum 
impact” in return for their contribution—the ultimate win-win proposition.
Distinct from the more familiar “privatization by stealth,” which is led by 
states and engineered via obfuscations, distractions, and sleights of hand; 
privatization creep is not always hidden from view. On the contrary, organ-
isations like the Omidyar Network are open about their belief in the power of 
markets, history of funding “economic inclusion” with an ultimate view to 
“reimagining capitalism.”5 Similarly, the Gates Foundation is clear that of the 
four ways in which it works include catalysing innovation, promoting multi-
stakeholderism, and creating market incentives for firms with a view to 
“repair the market.”6 The aggregate of foundations’ steady trajectory of mar-
ket expansion, integration, and penetration, privatization creep is gradual and 
incremental, but no less insidious.
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, privatisation creep in global devel-
opment has accelerated towards what Carroll (2015) calls the “deep marketi-
sation” of development, in which new synergies are found between 
Brooks and Kumar 5
macro-level financialization and intrusive technologies for micromanaging 
poor people towards the “right” financial behaviours (Gabor & Brooks, 
2017). An apparently unstoppable consensus that development equals culti-
vation of market-ready subjects is closing down spaces where, in the past, 
alternative, civil society-led visions of development centred on the citizen-
subject might have been debated and seriously considered (Mitchell & 
Sparke, 2016).
As demands for resources for global development grow in a world reeling 
and recovering from the Covid pandemic, we would urge caution and cir-
cumspection when it comes to eye-watering claims for the contributions of 
superelites’ philanthropy. Despite their acclaimed role as “innovators” and 
“disruptors” in global development, the primary outcome of foundations’ 
philanthropy has been, and continues to be, a more conservative and regres-
sive one: the extensification and intensification of the reach of capital into 
geographies and realms that were hitherto outside it.
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2. As outlined in the Davos Manifesto 2020 by Klaus Schwab, Founder and execu-





4. PDPs arose from the decline in public aid for R&D on “neglected diseases” asso-
ciated with developing countries on the one hand, and the lack of interest and 
investment from the private pharmaceutical sector on the other hand. Working as 
a virtual pharmaceutical firm, PDPs are aimed at incentivizing the development 
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of medicines and vaccines for diseases that are otherwise neglected by private 
corporations. By bringing together funding (largely public), scientists’ networks, 
and private firms for clinical trials of promising medicine/vaccine candidates, 
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